Voting trust arrangements have a long history at both the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Surface Transportation Board as devices to protect the incentives of acquiring firms and maintain the independence of acquiring and target firms during the pendency of regulatory investigation of the merger proposal. However, they are not without problems. The STB argued in 2001 that as Class I railroads have become fewer and larger, it may be difficult to find alternative purchasers for the target firm if the STB turns down the proposal. The Antitrust Division argued in 2016 that joint stock ownership creates anticompetitive and/or otherwise undesirable incentives, even if the independence of the voting trustee is complete. On the other hand, the functions served by voting trusts in railroad mergers are served by merger termination fees and other contractual "lockup" mechanisms in other parts of the economy, without the same incentive problems as voting trusts. Thus voting trusts may no longer serve a useful function in railroad merger deliberations.
mergers among class I railroads and about the use of independent voting trusts in such deals:
[W]e believe that, with only a limited number of major railroads remaining, we must take a much more cautious approach to future voting trusts in order to preserve our ability to carry out our statutory responsibilities.
2 NS declined to accept the CP merger offer and released a white paper from two former STB commissioners arguing that the STB would be unlikely to approve either this unusual voting trust arrangement or the merger transaction itself. 3 Two of the largest Class I railroads, the Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) and the Union Pacific (UP), stated their opposition to the merger, arguing that, if approved, it would lead to further industry consolidation into a very small number of transcontinental railroads. 4 When CP proceeded to file at the STB in March 2016 requesting approval of the proposed voting trust arrangement, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department filed its own statement of opposition, as did many shippers and shippers' groups. 5 Finally, in the face 2 The Board also noted that "This approach is consistent with the view expressed by CSX at oral argument that, while voting trusts can serve some public purpose, they should not be used routinely, but rather should be available only for those rare occasions when their use would be beneficial. In addition, there were as noted already concerns expressed about the increased concentration in the U.S. freight rail sector at the national level -from over two dozen Class I railroads in 1980 to fourteen in 1991 to seven today -and any further reduction was likely to raise policy issues in a number of areas beyond that of the loss of competition to existing shippers, including fears of the loss of competition for locating new industrial plants, the reduced number of firms engaged in innovation and experimentation, and the "too big to fail" phenomenon more often applied to financial markets.
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What was somewhat remarkable about this episode, however, was the attention devoted and controversy sparked by the independent voting trust proposal itself. As the CP noted and argued, independent voting trusts had been a standard part of U.S. freight railroad mergers for decades -CP calculated that the ICC and STB combined had 
Independent voting trusts and U.S. railroads
The voting trust -the formal delegation by shareholders of control of a corporation to a separate group of trustees, independent in various ways of day-to-day influence by those shareholders -has a long history in the area of corporate control in the United States, especially but not exclusively in the railroad industry. 12 In the second half of the nineteenth century, voting trusts were often set up as a tool of reorganization in connection with the bankruptcy of a railroad company, in order to assure debtors that the quality of management would be maintained during the recovery process. The substantial effect of this trust agreement is to vest the title of the interdicted stock and the power of voting it in a person as trustee, independent of the present holders of the stock and of the other defendants, thus, in effect, accomplishing the result sought in the Clayton Act proceedings.
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In the following year the B&O was found by the ICC to have again violated the Clayton Act by acquiring the stock of the Western Maryland Railway Company -in this case the focus was on the fact that they had done so without seeking advance approval from the ICC -and once again the placement of the shares in an independent voting trust was found to resolve the issue.
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At about the same time, the ICC began to address its mandate from the Transportation Act of 1920 to develop a "master plan" for the consolidation of U.S.
railroads into a financially sound and competitive system. 24 The ICC duly commissioned and published a proposed national railway system plan constructed by Harvard economics professor William Ripley and began holding hearings on its implementation.
In its first extensive decision discussing implementation, the Commission referred several times, at worst neutrally and at least once seemingly approvingly, to the use of independent voting trusts as a device to maintain managerial and operational 
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Broadly similar proposals for the use of independent voting trusts to maintain the independence of two railroad companies temporarily held in common ownership continued to be accepted or even ordered by the ICC in the forties, 27 sixties. 29 By the late fifties the Commission was treating such arrangements as standard operating procedure:
Voting-trust agreements have long been accepted by the Commission as a means of effecting compliance with the law in connection with holdings of stock in one railroad by another and without which the continued ownership of the stock might be considered unlawful and contrary to the public interest.
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Similarly:
[This] trust agreement was drafted in terms obviously designed to meet the requirements for independent voting trusts heretofore approved and/or prescribed by the Commission in a number of proceedings involving the question of one carrier's control of another where the object of the trust was to bar the beneficial owner of the securities from participation in the control, management, and operation of the issuing carrier.
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When put to the test, the use of independent voting trusts for such purposes by the In the many decades of ICC and STB consideration of proposals for the creation of independent voting trusts to maintain the independent management and operation of two railroads whose shares had been placed in common ownership, the lion's share of the attention by all participants was devoted to discussion of the precise terms of the contracts that set up the trusts: regulators and courts sought assurances that the trustees would be in fact independent of control or even influence from the acquiring company and its shareholders. For example:
The creation of voting trusts as a means of satisfying the provisions of section 5 cannot be effective for that purpose unless and until we are satisfied that the trusts constitute an actual divestiture of control.
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As noted above, in its Major Rail Consolidation Procedures decision of 2001, the STB expressed a newly heightened level of concern about the use of voting trusts in merger proceedings involving the class I railroads. However, the Board's stated principal concern was not trustee independence but rather the ability of the acquiring firm to find an alternative buyer of the target firm assets in the event of eventual STB denial of the merger application:
[I]t is precisely the divestiture process that now concerns us. When the ICC denied the application in SF/SP, at least two Class I railroads -the Denver and Rio Grand Western Railroad and KCS -were actively involved in bidding for SP when it had to be divested from the voting trust into which its stock had been placed pending the application. In contrast, today there would likely be cases where there would be no remaining railroad bidders acceptable to us to buy the shares held in a voting trust if we were to deny a major control transaction or impose conditions that the applicants choose not to accept. 
What happens in other industries?
There is not a great deal of discussion in the historical record of the reasons behind the ICC's apparent favoring of the voting trust mechanism beyond the simple and straightforward statements in the decisions quoted from above. As noted above, one rationale for the use of voting trusts in proposals to restructure the U.S. railroad system in the early 1930's was the depressed nature of the stock market at the time, and the associated fear of the consequences of placing a large number of shares of particular railroads on the stock exchange at a single point in time.
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With regard to railroad merger proceedings at the ICC, the closest we seem to get to a positive rationale for the use of voting trusts must be inferred from the language in a dissenting opinion from Commissioner Farrell in 1930:
In my opinion, … [section 7 of the Clayton Act] should be so construed as to permit one carrier to purchase a controlling interest in the stock of another carrier and hold the stock as an investment with the hope and expectation that such investment may be used later for consolidation purposes if the consolidation is approved by us. If such a purchase can not be made until after the intent to purchase has been advertised by an application made to us, it seems to me that it can not be made at all as a practical matter, because such advertisement would result in such an increase in the price demanded for the stock to be purchased that the purchase would not be in the public interest.
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Commissioner Farrell refers to issues that are by now well addressed in the broader finance literature. In the context of a potential merger, the potential acquiring firm expends resources as it searches for possible targets and investigates both the internal workings of those firms and the potential synergies of combining itself with them. When the potential acquirer announces its plan, it reveals information to the market that it has acquired from the expenditure of these resources. free ride on this information to bid up the value of the stock of a target firm, and other potential acquirers may free ride on this information to make their own, competing merger proposals. 40 One possible short-term outcome is the "winner's curse": the firm making the original announcement may win the bidding contest only if it is bidding more than the target is worth. 41 One possible longer-term outcome is that mergers that would have created synergies and so improved economic welfare do not take place, because the incentives for potential acquiring firms to expend the resources to find and merge with targets are reduced or eliminated by this free riding.
But this is not the only risk facing potential acquirers. There are a number of reasons that merger proposals may fail, including not only the appearance on the scene of competing acquirers but also rejection by boards of directors; delays, costs, and adverse decisions by antitrust or regulatory bodies; protectionist, uncooperative behavior by target firm management; and so on. Some of these are risks also faced by target firms as they consider and then enter into contracts with acquirers, and target firms face their own set of risks, including the loss of customers and employees following the merger announcement and, if a deal falls through, the market inference that the firm seeking to be the acquirer unearthed unfavorable information -what might be termed the "Miss
In fact there are many contractual mechanisms designed exactly to address the allocation of these risks among the parties to a merger agreement. They include the following:
• On the acquiring firm side, the inclusion of break-up fees to be paid by the target firm if it accepts an alternative bid has become a standard component of merger agreements, arguably required by fiduciary rules in order to maintain the option of the target firm's directors and board to find the best deal for shareholders.
43
• But break-up fees are not the only risk-allocation device available to acquiring firms. Other options -though apparently less frequently used -include stock lockups (giving the acquirer a call option on a specified number of shares in the target at a specified strike price), asset lockups (giving the acquirer a call option on certain assets of the target at a specified price), and, where permitted, no-shop provisions.
44
• On the target firm side, the inclusion of break-up fees to be paid by the acquirer to the target in case the deal fails to go through -so-called "reverse termination fees" -has become increasingly common in recent years. These seem to have been mostly associated at first with private equity deals and the accompanying uncertainty regarding the ability of the acquirer to line up financing, but they have lately spread to the mainstream and arguably become more complex in structure 43 See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, and as well. 45 A notable recent example was the unsuccessful attempt by AT&T to purchase T-Mobile USA, which resulted in the payment by AT&T of a break-up fee to Deutsche Telekom, the parent firm of T-Mobile USA, of $3 billion in cash and a volume of cellular spectrum valued at at least $1 billion.
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• But reverse termination fees are not the only risk-allocation device available to target firms. Other options include "best efforts" and "hell or high water" clauses, obligations to litigate, specified divestiture obligations, "ticking fees" (increasing payments due to the target firm if closing recedes past a specified date), and termination dates. 47 As a group, these tools are designed to allocate risks between acquirers and targets, in 
